Russia has sold military equipment and shared know-how with China that could help Beijing prepare airborne operations against Taiwan, according to an analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) based on leaked Russian documents.
The RUSI report, compiled from roughly 800 pages of material—contracts, equipment lists and meeting minutes obtained from the Black Moon hacktivist group—says the files reference deliveries and timelines for high-altitude parachute systems, amphibious assault vehicles and other gear that could be used to insert troops and equipment behind enemy lines. The institute provided some documents to The Associated Press and said they appear authentic; AP was not able to independently verify them.
While the documents do not explicitly mention Taiwan, RUSI analysts argue the systems would markedly improve China’s airborne capabilities and could shorten Beijing’s timetable for mounting a large-scale landing operation. High-level U.S. officials have warned that China has been ordered to be prepared for a possible invasion as early as 2027.
The papers describe meetings between Chinese and Russian delegations, payment and delivery schedules, and an agreement for training in China. One document dated September 2024 refers to an initial 2021 arrangement and indicates that technical analysis, software adaptation and manufacturing phases have been completed. The package reportedly includes 37 light amphibious assault vehicles, 11 amphibious anti-tank guns, 11 airborne armoured personnel carriers, plus command and observation vehicles—tabled at a total cost of more than $210 million. Beijing, the documents show, sought integration with Chinese communications and ammunition systems.
Of particular concern is a Russian system called Dalnolyot, designed for parachute drops from extreme altitudes carrying up to 190 kilograms. RUSI says Beijing requested tests from drops at 8,000 metres, which would allow paratroopers and cargo to glide tens of kilometres and potentially infiltrate territory without crossing hostile airspace. Analysts suggested such capability could support a “stage zero” operation—covertly inserting special forces and equipment before a larger assault.
RUSI researchers Oleksandr Danylyuk and Jack Watling noted the greatest value to China may be Russian operational experience—command, control and procedures for airborne landings—rather than the hardware alone. “The Chinese school of airborne landing is very young,” Danylyuk told RUSI, warning Moscow’s assistance could accelerate Beijing’s airborne programme by a decade or more.
Russian and Chinese officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Analysts caution that the documents do not prove China has paid for or received the equipment, and the material may be incomplete or altered.
The report also reflects lessons from Russia’s own setbacks: Moscow’s parachute units failed to secure a crucial early advantage in Ukraine in 2022 when airborne operations around Kyiv were repelled. Still, RUSI says the gear described in the files would be tailored for an invasion scenario rather than for Russia’s ongoing campaign in Ukraine.
Military experts say airborne insertions would likely play a supporting role in any cross-Taiwan operation rather than being the decisive move. Securing air superiority, suppressing Taiwanese defences and establishing a sustained seaborne and air bridge remain the core operational challenges, the report says. One proposed tactic cited by analysts is airdropping armoured vehicles onto open ground—such as golf courses—near ports and airfields to clear corridors for follow-on forces.
RUSI concludes that by supplying both equipment and training, Russia could position itself as a reliable defence supplier to China while also raising the geopolitical costs for the West. Some analysts warn Moscow may seek to draw Beijing into a confrontation with Washington over Taiwan, potentially diverting attention from Russia’s war in Ukraine.